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Summary.- The lack of consensus on the social and economic impact from access to 
land continues to generate heated political and academic debates. The existing 
empirical literature does not consider possible opportunity costs, factors that can 
affect this impact and different time horizons. Toward solving this problem, this 
article elaborates a theoretical argument on the potential benefits, opportunity costs 
and asset accumulation dynamics that may derive from gaining access to or 
increasing the size of rural land in developing countries. Empirical tests of the 
argument and poverty reduction assessment are then carried out using household 
data from Guatemala. Finally, policy and future research implications are derived. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
After being central for decades, land reform policies fell from national and international 
development agendas during the 1980s. The prevalence of a pro-market view in the US 
and UK governments and in the main international financial organizations, together with 
a general decrease of agricultural product prices in world markets, made land reforms 
out of fashion. However, in the face of poverty and inequality pervasiveness, and large 
areas of underutilized land in many rural areas of developing countries, together with the 
arrival of more “pro-state” governments in the US, UK and the World Bank, the 
academic and political debate about public action on the allocation of rural land 
recharged in the 1990s. 
This debate can be broadly summarized according to three current different views. One 
believes, as did the mainstream international thought during the 1980s, that asset 
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distribution and the agricultural sector constitute, at best, secondary development 
factors, and is therefore against public action on rural land distribution. This view calls 
for the importance of formalizing private property rights in order to allow formal 
markets to work, and is only willing to support direct public intervention on the 
provision of public goods like communication infrastructure and education. Academic 
arguments of this line of thought can be found in de Soto (2000) and Rigg (2006), while 
political examples are found in the current governments of Colombia, Guatemala and 
Honduras, all of which ended access to land programs coming from past governments. 
A second, opposite view, defends the essential development roles of both the 
agricultural sector and of public action on the distribution of resources. This vision 
argues that we should go back to extensive (and probably coercive) land reforms, 
integrating them into broader rural development policies, where the state provides a 
wide set of complementary support, mainly in the form of access to input and output 
markets. This view is similar to the developmental state approach of the 1970s, with the 
novelty that it makes new emphasis on the need to also give a leading role to civil 
society in the demand, design and execution of these policies. Academic arguments 
defending this view can be found in Griffin, Khan and Ickowitz (2002) and Akram-
Lodhi, Borras and Kay (2007), while political examples can be found in Bolivia’s and 
Venezuela’s current rural development strategies, and in many NGO demands (see for 
example CIP, 2006). 
Finally, there is a third, somewhat in the middle view, which argues that both the 
agricultural sector and the distribution of assets can be important development factors, 
and that the main problems of past land reform efforts were the coercive role played by 
the state in implementation, and the lack of secure property rights to land. It implies then 
a rationale for the state to distribute assets, including rural land, but complementing, 
instead of circumventing, the role of markets. The main supporters of this view are the 
World Bank, the International Fund for Agricultural Development and the Food and 
Agriculture Organization, which have been encouraging and financing a new brand of 
market-based access to land (voluntary) programs since the 1990s (see IFAD, 2001; 
World Bank, 2003; and FAO, 2006)1. 
Regarding the empirical academic literature, descriptive research in sub-Saharan Africa 
strongly associates rural poverty with the lack of land2. This type of evidence is 
supported by multivariate econometric work carried out in China (Burgess, 2001), 
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Ethiopia (Bigsten et al, 2003) and Mexico (Finan, Sadoulet and de Janvry, 2005), all of 
which find a positive and significant causal effect of land ownership on some indicator 
of household’s welfare3. However, an econometric study by López and Valdés (2000) in 
six Latin American countries finds that access to land ownership has a quite small effect 
on income, while Carter and May (1999) fail to find in South Africa any impact on 
income if other financial constraints that poor households face are not removed. 
The fundamental problem of this empirical literature is that it is not based on a theory or 
conceptual framework that considers not only possible benefits, but also possible costs 
and factors that can affect this impact. Each household makes its livelihood's decisions 
based on the needs, opportunities and restrictions that they face, and these decisions 
imply opportunity costs. Within the current context, where most households throughout 
the rural developing world still are involved in self agricultural activities, but where the 
proportion of income derived from other sources is growing, with very high inter and 
intra country variations (Reardon, Berdegue and Escobar, 2001; Haggblade, Hazell and 
Reardon, 2002; Winters et al, 2006), the opportunity costs of gaining access to land can 
be high and extremely heterogeneous across different households. Therefore, a better 
approach would be to try to assess the impact from access to land on both agricultural 
benefits and the possible loss of off-farm income opportunities. 
Furthermore, getting out of poverty is a dynamic process where location and asset 
accumulation are among the most important elements for each particular household. In 
our case, if there is a causal relationship between having access to land and the process 
of accumulating other assets or the place where the household is located, the impact 
from access to land programs will be different in the short than in the long run. 
Not being able to find on the literature a theory that directly addresses these issues, and 
in order to find some insights, we have searched the extensive literature that exists on the 
role of agriculture in development. However, after the mid 1960s all the academic 
literature has been macroeconomic in nature, with mainly no agreed upon significant 
conclusions (see Sarris, 2001; and Timmer, 2002). After the classic “Transforming 
Traditional Agriculture” (Schultz, 1964), which convincingly argued that traditional 
peasants were “poor but efficient,” economists abandoned the microeconomic debate on 
possible behavioral differences between productive sectors. Since then, agricultural 
microeconomic theory and empirical analysis have focused on how public action can 
correct market failures in order to promote agricultural development, but not on the issue 
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of whether these market failures have a different impact on the agricultural sector, or on 
whether agricultural development is important or not for overall development4. 
The main goal of this article is to develop a microeconomic (i.e. behavioral) narrative 
theory on the different factors that can affect the relationship between access to land and 
rural poverty in developing countries (sections two and three). We then perform an 
empirical test of the theory and assess the short and long run poverty reduction impact of 
access to land, depending on the opportunity costs faced by the household, using cross 
sectional household data from Guatemala (sections four through seven). Finally, we 
draw some policy implications and argue that this theory can also serve as an important 
ingredient for a needed unified (macro and micro) theory on the role of agriculture in 
development. 
 
2. A THEORY ON THE POTENTIAL POVERTY REDUCTION IMPACT 
FROM HAVING ACCESS TO AGRICULTURAL LAND 
While the main potential economic benefits from having access to agricultural land are 
monetary benefits and food consumption derived from agricultural activities or from 
renting it out, opportunity costs can be thought of as the possible off-farm employment 
opportunities lost. These costs depend on the off-farm employment opportunities present 
in the region (the context) and on the specific characteristics of the household (their 
assets). Let us analyze both types of factors. 
Regarding the context, if off-farm economic opportunities – in the form of labour supply 
or market demand – exist, the opportunity costs of accessing land can be higher than the 
benefits, due to the higher off-farm labour productivity that is normally present, at least 
during the developing phases of a country or region (Stern, 1994). Furthermore, an 
important restriction that an agricultural household faces, especially in developing 
countries, is the lack of transferability of whatever assets it owns, which normally have a 
high value for obtaining agricultural benefits and a low value for obtaining off-farm 
income. This is so because their human and social capital is highly agricultural-specific, 
and because in most developing countries land property rights (their main physical asset) 
are still informal and cannot be transferred using formal markets. 
Regarding household’s assets, a first glance about which might affect opportunity costs 
can be found in rural off-farm empirical studies in developing countries. For example, 
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Reardon, Berdegué and Escobar (2001) find in several Latin American countries that 
having more education, not being indigenous and living closer to a town increases non-
farm income. De Janvry, Sadoulet and Zhu (2005) find in China that higher education 
levels and lower distance to a town increases access to off-farm employment. 
However, we can expect that these factors have similar effects on agricultural income. 
That is, having higher education and living closer to an urban area will not only increase 
opportunity costs, but also increase agricultural benefits. If benefits and opportunity 
costs cancel each other, these factors will not have any effect on the poverty reduction 
impact derived from gaining access to land. But the fundamental hypothesis of our 
argument will state that household assets and its location differently affect agricultural 
benefits and opportunity costs. Specifically, we will hold that household size, education 
level and distance to an urban area have significantly different effects on on-farm and 
off-farm benefits, and therefore constitute main factors affecting the possible impact 
from gaining access to land. 
In order to explain the possible effects of these factors, we start with a brief description 
of the literature which analyses the relationships between urbanization, fertility rate, 
education and economic development. Throughout this literature, there is ample 
evidence supporting the idea that the process of economic development is closely linked 
to urbanization, fertility rate decrease and formal education level increase processes 
(Wrigley, 1969; Schultz, 1985; Bairoch, 1988; Galor, 2005). But it is not until recently 
that these relationships are being integrated into unified growth theories (Galor, 2005). 
Actually, Zhang’s (2002) and Sato and Yamamoto’s (2005) are the only theoretical 
models that we have found which try to integrate all these factors to explain economic 
development. Both theories start indicating the fact that poor households face a trade-off 
between quantity and quality of children – quality in terms of formal education level - 
implying that the relationship between fertility rates and education is negative. Then, 
both models offer an explanation of why urban inhabitants choose a strategy 
characterized by increasing formal education and decreasing fertility rates, while the 
rural inhabitants choose the opposite strategy. The explanation of the rural strategy relies 
on the need to have more children to maintain household consumption (Zhang) or 
income (Sato and Yamamoto), while the explanation of the urban strategy is based on 
having better access to formal education (Zhang) or on the use of more human capital 
intensive production technologies (Sato and Yamamoto) at the city. 
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Our argument is very similar, but we will try to explain the different fertility and 
educational strategies based on sector (agriculture versus other economic activities) 
instead of spatial (urban versus rural) differences, which allows us to also consider 
location as a variable strategy to explain. 
We hypothesize that agricultural households in developing countries choose livelihood 
strategies characterized by living further away from towns, having more children and 
less formal education. They tend to live further away because the reduction on market 
transaction costs associated with living closer to towns does not compensate as much the 
increase in land price because agricultural activities demand higher land quality and size, 
and allow more self-consumption possibilities. The result is the well known fact that 
agricultural households end up buying or renting land further away from urban areas. 
Our explanation about why agricultural households choose a strategy with more children 
and less formal education is based on two elements. First, since agricultural labour 
productivity is normally lower during the initial development phases of the economy, 
households without access to machinery demand higher labour forces in order to obtain 
the same level of income. And second, formal education has lower productivity in the 
agricultural sector of developing countries because a higher proportion of production 
technology is based on traditional knowledge, informally transmitted within the 
household and the community. 
 
3. CONSEQUENCES: HETEROGENEITY AND THE AGRICULTURAL 
POVERTY TRAP 
Two are the main consequences that derive from the hypothesis that education, number 
of children and distance to an urban area differently affect agricultural and non-
agricultural benefits. First, even if it can be reasonable to assess the average poverty 
reduction impact from having access to land in rural agrarian economies, this impact will 
be much more heterogeneous across households once off-farm income begins to account 
for an important proportion of total rural incomes, depending on the level of 
accumulated household assets and on their location. For those households that have 
invested in formal education and live close to towns, opportunity costs can be higher 
than benefits, implying that the impact from access to land on welfare would be 
negative. On the other hand, for those households that live far away from town, have 
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many children and low education levels, gaining access to land can have close to zero 
opportunity costs, implying a potentially high welfare impact. 
This argument gives a plausible explanation to the apparent contradictions that we have 
seen in the empirical literature. On the one hand, the insignificant agricultural land effect 
on income estimated in Latin America and South Africa would come from farmers’ lost 
off-farm economic opportunities in these places. The positive land effect on welfare 
found in sub-Saharan African countries would come from the lack of off-farm 
opportunities in this other region. 
The second consequence comes from the long-term effects deriving from the fact that 
agricultural households will tend to live in more remote areas, have more children and 
less formal education. These differentiated asset accumulation and location dynamics 
can get households stuck in an “agricultural poverty trap” if the rural economy develops 
secondary and tertiary economic activities. 
We have used the common term “trap” for two reasons. First, because as stated above, 
agricultural household’s assets are normally difficult to transfer in underdeveloped rural 
areas. And second, due to the fact that reverse causation will probably also be present, 
whereby households living in more remote areas and having fewer education will tend to 
remain being farmers. Therefore, we expect causation to flow in both directions, 
reinforcing the relation between staying in the agricultural sector, living in remote areas, 
and having lower education levels and higher fertility rates, producing a similar 
phenomenon to what economists that study institutional and technological change call 
“path dependency” (North, 1990; Arthur, 1993). This “path dependency” will get 
households stuck in an “agricultural poverty trap” to the extent that off-farm 
opportunities arise and the transferability of their assets is low. 
In order to check our theoretical argument and estimate the rural poverty impact of 
access to land according to its main statements, we use cross-sectional household data 
from Guatemala, a country where most rural households are involved in agricultural 
activities, but where off-farm income accounts for most of their total income. 
 
4. RURAL GUATEMALA: DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
We have used the data from the 2000 national living standard conditions survey carried 
out by the government of Guatemala (ENCOVI, 20005). The objective of this survey 
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was to identify the social and economic conditions of the national population and, 
therefore, it aimed to be representative, not of the different farm types, but of all the 
households in the country. The sample is also representative of both the rural and urban 
areas of Guatemala. Table 1 provides a summary description of the rural sub-sample6. 
Table 1. Characteristics of Guatemalan rural households across different income levels 
 Extreme poor* Poor Not poor Total 
Number of households 2326 834 636 3796 
Proportion of total (%) 61 22 17 100 
     
Agricultural land assets     
  Access to land (%) 82 59 48 71 
  Ownership of land (%) 59 40 38 52 
  Has property public document** (%) 73 80 84 75 
  Average land owned (has)** 4.3 3.3 7.7 4.5 
 Average land rented in (has)*** 2.0 1.7 3.4 2.1 
     
Household characteristics     
  Mean education title achieved**** 0.7 1.1 1.5 0.9 
  Average number of persons 6.1 5.4 4.4 5.6 
  Average in working age (%) 43 50 59 47 
  Female head (%) 12 16 16 14 
  Indigenous head (%) 57 39 29 49 
  Property of dwelling (%) 84 76 81 82 
  Dwelling property public doc. (%) 48 50 56 50 
     
Average welfare per capita     
  Total monetary income (US$) 157 515 1524 464 
  Proportion off-farm income (%) 81 91 90 85 
  Self consumption (US$) 141 109 107 129 
     
  Income + self-consumption (US$) 298 624 1631 593 
  Self consumption (%) 48 18 7 22 
  Own agric. monetary income (%) 9 7 12 10 
  Own non agric. business income (%) 6 12 20 14 
  Non self employment income (%) 37 63 61 54 
* For illustrative purposes extreme poverty line is set at US$1 per capita and day of total monetary 
income. Poverty line is set at US$2. 
** Only considering households that own land. 
*** Only considering households with rented in land 
**** For each household member 1= preparatory 2=primary 3=basic 4=diversified 5=university 6=post-
graduate 
Source: ENCOVI 2000 
Many characteristics regarding rural households in Guatemala can be derived from the 
table. The first aspect that stands out is the high level of rural poverty. Even if we take 
into account the value of self-consumption, 43% of the rural population are extremely 
poor and 77% are poor. This rural population depends mainly upon off-farm income, 
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which contributes 85% of total monetary income and 68% of total income (including 
self-consumption). However, it is, at the same time, highly involved in agricultural 
production activities, since 71% of rural households cultivate some land. 
In comparison to other rural households, the poorer have less education, larger families, 
higher dependency (children and old members), and are more attached to agricultural 
land. However, their monetary income derived from agricultural production is quite 
small. Their livelihoods depend mainly upon self-consumption of their agricultural 
production and salaries7. As households get richer, livelihoods rely more on monetary 
income, derived from salaries and/or own (agricultural or other) businesses. 
 
5. ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND EQUATIONS 
5.1. The welfare impact model 
The econometric literature on access to land and poverty reduction described in the 
introduction section has focused on the measurement of the marginal impact from 
having one more unit of agricultural land on some indicator of welfare. Without entering 
into the ongoing debate about which indicator - expenditure or income - is a better 
measure of welfare, both indicators are actually giving us a measure of monetary 
activity. Since access to agricultural land will also affect self-consumption, including a 
monetary value of this consumption into the total welfare index will give us a more 
complete assessment of its impact. The important point is that whatever indicator we 
use, we need to clearly make explicit how it is constructed and know the effects that this 
index can be capturing (see figure 1). 
In order to obtain estimates on both benefits and opportunity costs from access to land 
we also include on-farm and off-farm per capita income, and the value of self-
consumption as dependent variables. The value of self-consumption is calculated using 
ENCOVI data, which specifies products and quantities consumed, and their local prices. 
The welfare indicator will then be the sum of all these welfare components. 
Welfare =  per capita on-farm benefits + per capita self-consumption value + per capita 
off-farm income 
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Figure 1. The welfare impact paths from access to land 
 
Multivariate models are specified following the “sustainable livelihoods” framework, 
which states that rural household welfare depends upon their level of cumulated assets, 
the type of activity in which they are involved and the context in which they develop 
their livelihood strategy (Carney, 1988; Ellis, 2000). We, therefore, follow the same 
econometric strategy used in the literature reviewed in the introductory section, but we 
decompose the welfare indicator, and add a dummy variable indicating whether or not 
the household is involved in on-farm activities. We also add the time since land was 
accessed, and compare the results deriving from descriptive and multivariate 
econometric approaches: 
Each welfare component = α + β1 farmer + β2 landown + ε            (1) 
Each welfare component = α + β1 farmer + β2 landown + γ time + δH + θL + ε             (2) 
β1 and β 2 are the parameters of interest. “Farmer” is a dummy variable that equals one 
when the household owns or rents in any amount of agricultural land, and zero 
otherwise. “Landown” measures the hectares of agricultural owned land. Using these 
two variables we will be able to distinguish the effect of belonging to the farming sector 
from the effect of having more or less quantity of agricultural land. The estimated 
coefficient β1 in the equation where per capita off-farm income is the dependent variable 
will give us an estimate of the opportunity costs of accessing land. 
The variable “time” measures the number of years since the household owns the land. 
We include this variable in order to estimate β1 and β 2 more accurately, independently 
Access to 
agricultural 
land
On-farm monetary 
benefits 
Self-consumption 
Welfare 
Total income or 
expenditure 
Off-farm income 
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of the time since land is owned. H represents a set of household controls, including 
classical variables that try to capture human, financial and social capital. 
Since, following our theory, we expect that farmers will tend to live in more remote (and 
probably poorer) areas, we will use the most specific context controls available in the 
data. Matrix L then represents a set of dummies for each particular community where the 
household is located, as a control for context. 
Finally, ε represents all those factors which are not included in the model but have some 
effect on the dependent variable. Based on the “sustainable livelihoods” framework, we 
make the assumption that controlling for household assets, context and type of activity 
(being a farmer or not), there are no omitted observable variables in the model. 
We also have to make the assumption that there are no omitted unobserved variables, 
such as land quality and ability. For example, land quality might be negatively correlated 
with land size, in which case we would get a downward bias on the estimation of β2. 
Ability is commonly argued to be positively associated to total years of education, but 
while this might happen on a personal basis, it does not make much sense on aggregated 
household variables. 
Finally, we also face the ubiquous possibility of having simultaneous causation, whereby 
the initial level of welfare could also affect the quantity of land or the occupational 
choice. The problem is that there are no external agents affecting the variables in our 
model, so we cannot use any instrumental variable to deal with this issue. The only thing 
we can do is again to try to figure out the possible direction of the possible bias. In this 
sense, we start remembering that the welfare indicator is constructed as the sum of 
agricultural production self-consumption value and sales, and off-farm income. In the 
data, the agricultural components of welfare directly derive from producing the land that 
the household has, and not the other way around, so there cannot be simultaneity here. 
On the other hand, it is certainly difficult to theorize about the effect of total household 
off-farm income on occupational choice and land size. We can think that having more 
off-farm income might influence leaving the agricultural sector, or staying in it and 
buying more land. If this is true, we would have a downward bias in the “farmer” 
estimate (β1), and an upward bias in the estimation of β2 (which could offset the 
downward bias argued above). 
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In any case, as stated in the introduction, in this article we are more interested on 
improving our understanding about the factors that affect the poverty reduction impact 
of access to land, than on finding a proven unbiased estimate of the impact, something 
that many researchers argue could only be convincingly done using laboratory-like 
randomized evaluation methods. Therefore, we will just make the (possibly strong)  
assumption, as in all the articles that have been published on this issue, that equation 2 
will give us the estimated direct impact from having access to land (β1), and the 
estimated direct marginal impact from having one more hectare of land (β2). 
Equation 1 represents the descriptive approach followed by the studies on access to land 
impact in sub-Saharan Africa. In this case, coefficients β1 and β2 indicate correlations 
(not direct effects) which are present in the sample. Since in our theoretical argument we 
are expecting that access to land, location and the accumulation of other assets present 
causal bi-directional correlations between them, these coefficients serve as a proxy to the 
long term sum of direct and indirect effects of access to land and land size on welfare. 
Simply putt, our theory argued that correlations between the independent variables in the 
sustainable livelihood framework (equation 2) are causal and bi-directional. Therefore, 
β1 and β2 in equation 1 will give us a proximate estimate of the historical, path-
dependent, direct and indirect, welfare impact from access to land in Guatemala. On the 
other hand, β1 and β2 in equation 2 will give us a shorter term estimate of the direct 
welfare impact of having access to land in Guatemala. 
5.2. The factors that affect the welfare impact form access to land 
The theoretical hypothesis stated that formal education, number of household members 
and location (distance to a town) differently affect agricultural benefits and opportunity 
costs. In order to check if this is the case in Guatemala and assess the magnitude of these 
differences, we will estimate the following equation: 
Y =  off-farm income (opportunity costs) – on-farm income (monetary benefits + self-
consumption value) 
Y = α + δ farmer + θ landown + β1 time + β2 title + β3 headage + Β4 femhead + β5 
indighead + β6 education + β7 housesize + Β8 nodepend + β9 savings + β10           (3) 
organization + β11 distance + ε 
In this case, the equation does not represent a choice model, since households don’t try 
to maximize or minimize Y. It just serves to illuminate how the main factors of our 
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argument can differently affect benefits and opportunity costs. The variables that served 
as controls in equation 2, now become the variables of interest and vice versa.  “Title” 
indicates weather land has a property title or not; “headage“ indicates the head of the 
household age; “femhead” is a dummy variable indicating weather the household is 
headed by a female;  “indighead” is a dummy variable indicating weather the household 
is headed by an indigeous person; “education” represents the average title obtained by 
the household members; “housesize” indicates the number of household members; 
“nodepend” indicates the proportion of household members in working age (from 15 to 
55 years old); “savings” is a dummy variable indicating weather the household has 
monetary savings or not; and “organization” indicates the proportion of household 
members which participate in typically poor organizations8. Finally, instead of using a 
matrix of location dummies, we now introduce the variable “distance”, which measures 
the time that it takes to travel, with the most commonly used vehicle, from the 
community where the household is located to the closest town9. 
According to this equation, those variables which have a positive and significant 
coefficient will represent factors whose marginal increase is related to a higher marginal 
increase in opportunity costs (off-farm income) than in agricultural income. And vice 
versa, those variables which have a negative and significant coefficient represent those 
factors that have a stronger association with on-farm income than with off-farm income. 
 
5.3. Capturing the possible long term agricultural poverty trap 
In order to explore the possible association between being a farmer and living in more 
remote areas or accumulating fewer economic assets we will estimate the following 
models: 
Asset accumulation = α + β1farmer + β2 landown + ε                       (4) 
Asset accumulation = α + β1farmer + β2 landown + π income + δH + θL + ε              (5) 
Distance to closest town = α + β1farmer + β2landown + ε                     (6) 
Distance to closest town = α + β1farmer + β2landown + π income + δH + ε              (7) 
The number of household members, the mean education title achieved and a dummy 
variable indicating whether the household has financial savings or not, will form the set 
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of dependent variables used to measure asset accumulation. In this case we also 
introduce per capita income as a control. 
Similar to the above models on welfare impact, equations without controls (4 and 6) 
represent the descriptive approach, with coefficients of interest (β1 and β2 ) showing the 
sum of direct and indirect relations, while equations with controls (5 and 7) showing 
direct causality. However, it must be noted that in this case we are expecting the 
direction of causality to run in both directions between dependent and independent 
variables. We cannot therefore interpret coefficients as impacts, but as reinforcing, two 
way causalities which produce path dependency. 
 
6. ESTIMATION METHODS 
With the exception of Finan et al. (2005) and Carter and May (1999), a linear 
relationship between land quantity and welfare is used to estimate the models in the 
econometric empirical literature. That is, one more hectare of owned land is expected to 
have the same impact on welfare independent of the amount of land that a household 
already owns. However, as Finan et al. (2005) argue, credit and labor market 
imperfections cause that many households will not be able to maintain production 
intensity as land area increases. Therefore, it is very likely that the relationship between 
land area and welfare has a more complex form, probably with decreasing slopes. 
The easiest device in econometric modeling for allowing nonlinear correlations is to 
either use logarithms for the dependent or independent variables or to add quadratic or 
even cubed independent terms. However, non-parametric regression estimation methods 
have the advantage that they don’t impose any particular functional form to the 
correlation between the explained and the explanatory variables, which allows us to have 
a better understanding on the actual shape of the correlations present in the sample. 
For our empirical analysis we will combine the use of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
multivariate regressions10 with the use of a multivariate scatterplot smoother developed 
by Royston and Cox (2005). This non-parametric multivariate scatterplot will help us 
understand the shape of the relationship between land quantity and the different welfare 
components analyzed. We will afterwards use this information to stratify the sample and 
compute again regular OLS regressions for each stratum. Robust t statistics are used 
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after OLS because both Breuch and Pagan’s (1979) and White’s (1980) tests suggest the 
presence of heteroskedasticity in the sample. 
 
7. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
7.1. Results from the welfare impact model 
We start the welfare impact analysis by showing the results from a classical OLS 
regression using both monetary and total income (monetary income plus self 
consumption value) as indicators of welfare (table 2). 
Table 2. The influence of using different welfare indicators and including controls 
 Y1= annual monetary per capita 
income (US$) 
Y2= annual total per capita 
income (US$) 
Being a farmer (dummy) -401.195*** -208.202*** -295.842*** -101.638*** 
 (12.20) (7.97) (8.89) (3.79) 
Agricultural land owned (ha ) 5.635* 3.900 6.952** 5.407* 
 (1.80) (1.33) (2.19) (1.82) 
Time since land is owned (years) 1.460 1.705* 2.171** 1.998** 
 (1.49) (1.78) (2.13) (2.02) 
Head’s age (years)  2.216***  2.899*** 
  (2.64)  (3.38) 
Female head (dummy)  -68.777**  -78.346** 
  (2.30)  (2.58) 
Indigenous head (dummy)  -55.905***  -68.836*** 
  (2.81)  (3.34) 
Mean education (title obtained)  298.367***  286.953*** 
  (10.99)  (10.49) 
Number of members  -39.576***  -46.503*** 
  (8.94)  (10.27) 
Proportion in working age  133.849**  157.239** 
  (2.15)  (2.48) 
Financial savings (dummy)  633.181***  632.871*** 
  (7.47)  (7.46) 
# of members in poor organizations  -66.138*  -22.775 
  (1.72)  (0.58) 
Observations11 3790 3790 3790 3790 
Adjusted R-squared 0.05 0.26 0.03 0.24 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. Community dummies included in columns 2 and 4 but not reported. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Just using monetary income and not adding control variables, farming households with 
less than 69 ha of agricultural land are poorer than the rural landless households12. Now, 
if we take into account the value of self consumption, farmers with more than 40 ha have 
more welfare than landless non farmers. As stated above, this result shows the direct and 
indirect effects of access to land on welfare, and can be a measure of the low long term 
effect that having access to land has produced in Guatemala. If we now control for 
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location and other assets, we get that those households with more than 9.1 ha have more 
welfare than landless non farmers, which would be an estimation of the short run impact 
from having access to land. 
In any case, implementing an extensive access to land program in Guatemala would not 
seem to be advisable. Even in the case that the program would be implemented good 
enough as to select only those households which do not have any other potential income 
source except for farming13, it would have to assure that each one of them reaches 67.5 
ha of land in order to obtain an increase of one daily US$ per capita14. We try next to 
find what might be behind these poor first-sight results. Note that here is where most of 
the literature on access to land and rural poverty ends. 
7.2. Decomposing the welfare indicator 
In the next table we divide the welfare indicator into its different components. It can be 
seen why the aggregate effect from being a farmer on total income is negative: being a 
farmer has a strong negative effect on off-farm income, which more than offsets its 
positive effect on on-farm monetary benefits and self consumption. 
Table 3. The relationship between land and different types of benefits (in US$) 
 Y1 =  
Pc on-farm 
monetary 
benefits 
Y2 =  
Pc self-
consump-
tion 
Y31 =  
On-farm pc 
total 
benefits 
Y4 =  
Off-farm 
pc income 
Y51 = 
Monetary 
pc income 
Y61 =  
Total pc 
income 
Being a farmer (dummy) 77.326*** 106.56*** 183.89*** -285.5*** -208*** -101.6*** 
 (5.92) (18.42) (12.59) (12.25) (7.97) (3.79) 
Agricultural land own (ha ) 6.195*** 1.507*** 7.702*** -2.295* 3.900 5.407* 
 (2.98) (4.86) (3.60) (1.82) (1.33) (1.82) 
Time land owned (years) 1.005* 0.293 1.298** 0.701 1.705* 1.998** 
 (1.90) (1.20) (2.17) (0.95) (1.78) (2.02) 
Head’s age (years) 0.724 0.683*** 1.407** 1.492** 2.216*** 2.899*** 
 (1.38) (4.28) (2.50) (2.33) (2.64) (3.38) 
Female head (dummy) -35.32*** -9.569 -44.89*** -33.452 -68.78** -78.346** 
 (4.34) (1.42) (4.17) (1.15) (2.30) (2.58) 
Indigenous head (dummy) -40.69*** -12.931** -53.62*** -15.211 -55.9*** -68.83*** 
 (3.62) (2.37) (4.20) (0.95) (2.81) (3.34) 
Mean education (years) 21.867** -11.41*** 10.453 276.50*** 298.4*** 286.9*** 
 (2.13) (3.01) (0.93) (10.97) (10.99) (10.49) 
Number of people -11.46*** -6.927*** -18.39*** -28.11*** -39.6*** -46.50*** 
 (4.73) (7.38) (6.91) (7.88) (8.94) (10.27) 
Proportion in working age 17.903 23.390* 41.293 115.945** 133.85** 157.24** 
 (0.77) (1.85) (1.53) (1.99) (2.15) (2.48) 
Financial savings (dummy) 87.859** -0.309 87.550* 545.32*** 633.2*** 632.9*** 
 (2.02) (0.03) (1.93) (7.59) (7.47) (7.46) 
Members in poor orgs. (#) -41.112** 43.363*** 2.252 -25.026 -66.138* -22.775 
 (2.16) (4.94) (0.11) (0.74) (1.72) (0.58) 
Observations 3790 3790 3790 3790 3790 3790 
Adjusted R-squared 0.06 0.26 0.13 0.30 0.26 0.24 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. Community dummies and constant term included but not reported. 
1 Y3 = Y1+Y2; Y5= Y1+Y4; Y6= Y1+Y2+Y4 * significant 10%; ** significant 5%; *** significant 1% 
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However, the data from table 3 leads to better expectations from possible access to land 
programs. If we again assume that a program would be able to select only those 
households with practically zero opportunity costs, which can now be done by ignoring 
the off-farm negative coefficient of being a farmer, we can argue that an average benefit 
of one daily US$ per capita would be reached by assuring an average of 22 ha of 
agricultural land to farmers15. Nonetheless, we would still be far from being able to 
recommend an access to land program in Guatemala based on these results. 
7.3. Relaxing the functional form and stratifying the sample 
We go now a step further and analyze if different quantities of land owned differently 
affects each of the different indicators. In other words, instead of imposing a linear 
relationship we now relax the functional form between land quantity and each income 
indicator with the help of multivariate non-parametric regression scatterplots. 
 
Graph 1. Per capita monetary income and farm size16 
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Graph 2.Per capita monetary farm benefits and farm size 
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Graph 3. Per capita self consumption value and farm size 
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Graph 4. Per capita off-farm income and farm size 
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From the graphs one can see that it is right in the small quantity levels of land owned 
where major changes take place: farm monetary and self consumption benefits greatly 
increase while off-farm income greatly decreases. Based on the graphs we now run OLS 
regressions splitting the sample into two groups to see how coefficients are affected 
(table 4). 
The extraordinary differences in productivity between small and medium to large farms 
observed in table 6 must be due to either differing incentives or to the lack of capital. 
Large owners produce less intensively than small owners either because they rely more 
on off-farm benefits or because they do not have enough capital to proportionally 
increase investments and inputs (see graph 5). 
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Table 4. The relationship between agricultural land, on-farm benefits and off-farm 
income, stratified by land size 
 
Farm 
size 
strata 
 
 
On-farm 
monetary 
benefits 
(US$) 
Self-
consumpt. 
(US$) 
Total farm 
benefits 
(US$) 
Off-farm 
income 
(US$) 
Total 
income 
(US$) 
 
Obs. 
Being a farmer 55.81*** 112.09*** 167.90*** -251.6*** -83.7*** 
 (4.95) (18.58) (13.05) (11.49) (3.37) 
Agric. owned land (ha) 61.84*** 37.787*** 99.62*** -56.94*** 42.67 
 (2.70) (5.34) (4.04) (3.54) (1.52) 
Ownership time (years) -0.65 -0.675** -1.32** 1.378* 0.055 
 
 
 
0 -2 ha 
 (1.26) (2.49) (2.22) (1.67) (0.05) 
 
 
 
3347 
Agric. owned land (ha) 5.40** 0.662 6.06** -0.379 5.684 
 (2.04) (1.50) (2.27) (0.21) (1.39) 
Ownership time (years) 3.35 1.534* 4.888 1.482 6.370 
 
2-90 ha 
 (0.84) (1.89) (1.20) (0.58) (1.16) 
 
442 
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. Local dummies, household controls and constant term included but not 
reported. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Graph 5. The relationship between productive intensity and farm size17 
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However, the most important fact is that if we now ignores off-farm opportunity costs, a 
farming household would only need 2 ha of agricultural land to get an average benefit of 
one daily US$ per capita. But, if we take opportunity costs into account this average 
household would be just even: it would earn the same from on-farm activities that it 
would fail to gain from off-farm activities. 
7.4. The factors that affect the poverty reduction impact of access to land 
In order to test the main hypothesis of the theoretical framework – that household assets 
and location differently affect access to land benefits and opportunity costs – we start 
showing the results from the OLS estimation of equation 3 (table 5). We can see that 
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non-indigenous households, with less formal education, fewer members, no savings and 
living further away from urban areas are the ones who gain more benefits from on-farm 
than from off-farm activities. We could think of these types of households as the ones 
who would probably benefit more from getting access to land or increasing the size of 
their farm. On the contrary, those household that have the opposite characteristics have 
more off-farm opportunities, which means that getting access to land or increasing their 
farm size would probably make them poorer, if they had to pay for it. 
Table 5. Differential relationship between assets, on-farm income 
and off-farm income 
 Off-farm income 
– on-farm income (monetary 
benefits + self-consumption) 
Being a farmer (dummy) -454.477*** 
 (16.66) 
Agricultural land owned (ha ) -10.027*** 
 (5.40) 
Time since land is owned (years) -1.734* 
 (1.70) 
Titled agricultural land (dummy) 34.699 
 (1.48) 
Head’s age (years) 0.298 
 (0.41) 
Female head (dummy) -7.201 
 (0.27) 
Indigenous head (dummy) 36.092* 
 (1.94) 
Education (average title obtained) 226.336*** 
 (10.47) 
Number of members -8.897** 
 (2.25) 
Has savings (dummy) 288.820*** 
 (3.44) 
Proportion of members in poor organizations -14.916 
 (0.40) 
Distance from community to town (hours) -23.965*** 
 (3.34) 
Observations18 3091 
Adjusted R2 0.25 
   Robust t statistics in parentheses. Constant term included but not reported. 
     * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Therefore, we see that evidence in rural Guatemala supports our main theoretical 
hypothesis: education, distance to urban areas and number of household members, all 
have a differently associated with on-farm and off-farm incomes. In this case, ethnicity 
and savings also have different relationships. Indigenous households probably get higher 
earnings from off-farm income due to their involvement in the important handicraft and 
textile industry of rural Guatemala. The higher association of savings with off-farm 
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income can also be interpreted as a different accumulation dynamic of this asset between 
sectors. 
7.5. The causal association between access to land, location and other assets: evidence 
on the existence of an “agricultural poverty trap” 
We continue the empirical analysis estimating equation four to seven in order to see if 
we can find any evidence on that being a farmer may lead to live in poorer areas and to 
have fewer economic assets (table 6). As it can be seen in columns two, four, and six, 
being a farmer is directly and causally associated to having more household members, 
less education and living further away from urban areas. Columns one, three, and five 
show the sum of direct and indirect associations between the same variables, which end 
up strengthening the links in the longer term, providing more evidence on the existence 
of path-dependency19. On the other hand, once being a farmer or not is controlled, 
quantity of agricultural land is causally associated with household size and distance to a 
main urban area, but not with education. 
Table 6. Evidence on the causal association between agricultural land and household 
size, educational level and distance to town. 
 Number of members Mean education (title 
obtained) 
Distance from the 
community to an 
urban area (hours) 
Being a farmer (dummy) 1.061*** 0.706*** -0.321*** -0.127*** 0.256*** 0.163*** 
 (11.81) (6.78) (11.50) (4.87) (5.00) (2.75) 
Agricultural land owned (ha ) 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.004*** 0.001 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (3.63) (3.58) (3.70) (0.39) (4.09) (4.01) 
Time land is owned (years)  0.004  -0.001  0.002 
  (0.80)  (1.16)  (1.40) 
Per capita income (US$)  -0.00***  0.000***  -0.000 
  (6.73)  (8.88)  (0.46) 
Head’s age (years)  -0.004  0.001  -0.000 
  (1.49)  (1.16)  (0.28) 
Female head (dummy)  -1.16***  0.038  -0.033 
  (9.56)  (1.25)  (0.55) 
Indigenous head (dummy)  0.291***  -0.197***  -0.065 
  (3.09)  (9.17)  (1.61) 
Education (title obtained)  0.599***    -0.21*** 
  (8.93)    (6.38) 
Number of members    0.032***  0.018** 
    (8.90)  (2.23) 
Proportion in working age  -2.32***  0.993***  0.042 
  (11.51)  (18.36)  (0.47) 
Financial savings (dummy)  0.042  0.357***  -0.083 
  (0.26)  (7.87)  (0.88) 
Proportion members in orgs.  -0.71***  0.267***  -0.064 
  (4.93)  (7.90)  (0.96) 
Observations 3790 3790 3790 3790 3091 3091 
Adjusted R-squared 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.33 0.02 0.03 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. Constant term included but not reported. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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As it can be seen in the tables from the above sections, the negative welfare impact from 
having more household members, having less formal education and living in more 
remote locations is significant and quantitatively important, mainly due to their negative 
effect on off-farm income. This implies that possible short term benefits from gaining 
access to land can however give up to an agricultural poverty trap, whereby these 
benefits can turn to be negative in the long term. 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The results from this study show how in a country like Guatemala, where approximately 
70% of the rural population is involved in self-production agricultural activities but only 
32% of their income (including the value of self-consumption) is derived from these 
activities, only those households with more than two hectares of agricultural land are 
found to be on average less poor than the landless rural households. Due to either lack of 
capital or lack of productive incentives, as land holdings get larger productive intensity 
decreases, implying that an amount of at least 67 hectares of land per household would 
be needed to obtain an average increase of US$ 1 per capita and day. The conclusion 
from these results is that extensive land distributions are not a cost-effective solution for 
rural poverty reduction in countries where off-farm income is becoming increasingly 
important in sustaining rural household livelihoods. 
However, theory and results from this study also show that the reason for this poor 
welfare impact estimates from access to agricultural land mainly comes from the high 
opportunity costs, in terms of lost off-farm opportunities, derived from entering into the 
self-employment agricultural sector in rural Guatemala. If, instead of considering the 
total rural population, we now focus only on poor rural households with little or no land 
which do not face any real off-farm opportunities in the short term, results show that the 
same two hectares of agricultural land suffices to gain an average total welfare increase 
of US$ 1 per capita and day, an amount that can get a rural household out of poverty. On 
average, half of this welfare increase comes from self-consumption and the other half 
from selling agricultural products. Therefore, if an access to land program is able to 
select this type of beneficiary, its short run poverty reduction potential can be significant 
and important. 
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One may then observe the same seemingly contradictory picture that was laid out in the 
introduction. On the one hand agricultural benefits are getting proportionally smaller 
against other economic activities in many rural areas of the developing world. On the 
other hand, still high proportions of the rural poor households are involved, either totally 
or partially, in agricultural activities, whereby access to small amounts of agricultural 
land can enable them to reap important and quick benefits in the forms of self-
consumption and monetary income. 
Land policy implications from these results can be crucial. Depending on their particular 
ideology, many academics and policy makers have normally focused - and still do - on 
one or the other side of the picture. Putting it simply, the more pro-agrarian and pro-
distribution view tends to see only the positive on-farm side while the more anti-agrarian 
and pro-market view tends to see only the negative off-farm side. So, who is right?  
The answer depends upon the time frame, the likelihood of future non-agricultural 
opportunities, and on how access to land policies are designed and implemented. Based 
on our theory and results, supporting access to land for poor households that do not face 
off-farm opportunities can help them get out of poverty in the short term, but can also 
“push” them towards a long term “agricultural poverty trap” if new off-farm 
opportunities arise and asset transferability is low. This is so because being a farmer can 
imply living further away from urban areas (with less public service and more 
transaction costs), having less formal education and having more family members. 
The question now would be: how do we reconcile the short term benefits with the 
possible long term costs?. Public policy interventions to reduce this long term 
agricultural poverty trap would have to take into account: (1) to not further augment the 
trap with regulatory restrictions on the transferability of land, as has been the case with 
many access to land programs; (2) to formalize land property rights in order to facilitate 
its transferability; and (3) to not distort existing market incentives, neither towards 
access to agricultural land nor against it.  
In great part due to the contradicting visions on the benefits from access to land 
explained above, the current trend in rural programs of many developing countries is to 
either implement ambitious access to land projects or to implement income generation 
projects where explicitly access to land cannot be the subject of support. Both 
approaches impose artificial incentives on the beneficiaries and, since they are based on 
ideologies towards or against the agricultural sector and asset distribution, often fail to 
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survive a change in government. In our view, a more effective approach would be to 
implement more stable and flexible rural income generation programs where access to 
land can be the subject of support, as with any other asset that the beneficiary needs. In 
this way, potential beneficiaries will weight, at least the short term, potential benefits 
and opportunity costs from investing in either agricultural activities (including getting 
access to more land) or on off-farm activities. Longer term concerns of a possible 
agricultural poverty trap would depend on factors external to the beneficiary, whereby if 
the region as a whole develops, it is highly probable that new off-farm opportunities 
with higher benefits will arrive. Expecting this probability, the public program would 
just have to assure as far as possible the future transferability of assets, in order to allow 
for greater flexibility. 
 
9. FUTURE LINES OF RESEARCH 
We would like to finish indicating two future lines of research that derive from this 
study. One is theoretical, related to the role of agriculture in development, and the other 
one is applied, related to the design of rural development public intervention 
instruments. 
The narrative theory developed here offers a behavioural explanation about how the 
traditional agricultural sector hinders the process of urbanization, the extension of formal 
education and the reduction of fertility rates. We have used this theory to asses the 
poverty reduction impact from access to land, but it can also be extended to analyze the 
economic development role of agriculture. In this sense, we could argue that these 
mentioned effects from traditional agriculture hinder technological progress and cause 
higher demographic pressures, with the consequent negative impact on economic 
development. 
Based on this argument it could then be justified that public action should focus on the 
industrial and service sectors and marginalize the agricultural sector, at least during the 
initial developing phases of a nation or region. However, this conclusion would be 
misguided since the argument laid in this article only applies to the long term, and is also 
only partial. That is, it does not represent all the possible causal relationships between 
the development of the agricultural sector and overall economic development. In order 
to fully establish these relationships one would need to integrate at least the 
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microeconomic approach of our theory with the macroeconomic approach that has been 
followed throughout the last decades. The main line of agricultural macroeconomic 
theories, initiated by the work of Johnston and Mellor (1961), makes a strong emphasis 
on the positive interaction between agriculture and other sectors of the economy, which 
must also be considered. This theoretical integration of macro and micro approaches 
could help unblock the never ending debate on the economic development role of 
agriculture. 
The other future line of research, more than an extension of this study, would be 
complementary and more applied in nature. This line consists on the impact assessment 
of land taxes, subsidies, titling, and market regulation on land productivity and land 
market activity. All these elements form the set of available land administration 
instruments, which, via their impact on land market activity and land productivity, could 
have a significant impact on the benefits and costs of gaining access to land. All these 
public instruments can increase or decrease the supply of land in formal markets, with 
the consequent impact on the cost of accessing land; and can also promote or hinder 
productivity incentives, with the consequent impact on the benefits from gaining access 
to land. We still know, however, little on how to design these instruments – land taxes, 
land titling, land market regulations and land-related subsidies – for them to have the 
most positive impact possible. This line of research would bring helpful results for the 
design of public policies to promote economic and social development in the rural areas 
of developing countries. 
 
NOTES 
1 We are aware that these agencies have recently financed or are still financing market-based access to 
land programs in Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Egypt, Guatemala, Honduras, the Philippines, South 
Africa and several states in India. 
2 See Kinsey (1999) in Zimbabwe, Ellis and Bahiigwa (2003) in Uganda, Ellis and Mdoe (2003) in 
Tanzania, and Jayne et al. (2003) in Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Mozambique and Zambia. 
3 It should be noted here that Finan, Saodulet and de Janvry (2005) find a significant impact from access to 
land on a complex welfare index that they construct but don’t find a significant impact on total income. 
4 For good reviews on agricultural development microeconomic theories and empirical studies, see 
Bardhan, (1989) and de Janvry, Sadoulet and Murgai (2002). 
5  “Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida”. 
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6 The original ENCOVI 2000 contains 3,852 rural households. We have eliminated observations for which 
there is missing data, ending up with 3,796 households. 
7 Remittances are not very important, accounting for only 3% of total income (including self-consumption) 
8 Cooperative, religious group, community, female groups, etc. The idea is to try to capture organizations 
which are poor-specific in order to have a better control over the possible historical correlation between 
poor households and the agricultural sector. 
9 ENCOVI 2000 data does not include distance from each household to the closest town, but it includes 
this variable in the community questionnaire, which has been used as a proxy for each household. Town is 
defined as a place where there is a bank office and a market place. 
10 Except for the equations where the dependent variable is binary, where a probit estimation method is 
used. 
11 Households with more than 90 ha of land have been withdrawn in all the estimations since there are 
only six observations for the range from 90 to 441 ha. Results including these observations don’t change 
the level of significance on the variables of interest, and only give slightly different coefficients. 
12 (401.195 - 8.2x1.460)/5.635 = 69; being 8.2 the average time since land is owned in the sample. 
13 That is, we ignore the “being a farmer” negative coefficient. 
14 365 days / 5.407 US$/ha = 67.5 ha. 
15 (365 days - 183.89-8.2x1.298)/7.702 = 22 ha 
16 Upper and lower lines show 95% confidence intervals. 
17 Productive intensity is measured in Quetzales/ha, and includes the value of inputs, labour and 
amortization of equipment. 
18 The number of observations is smaller than the total household sample because there is some missing 
data. 
19 Although not reported, probit regressions where also estimated with financial savings as the independent 
variable, finding a negative significant correlation with being a farmer, but a non-significant negative 
correlation when controls were added.
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